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Abstract:
This paper proposes an event-triggered add-on safety mechanism to adjust the control param-
eters for timely braking in a networked vehicular system while maintaining maneuverability.
Passenger vehicle maneuverability is significantly affected by the combined-slip friction effect,
in which larger longitudinal tire slips result in considerable drop in lateral tire forces. This is
of higher importance when unexpected dangerous situations occur on the road and immediate
actions, such as braking, need to be taken to avoid collision. Harsh braking can lead to high-slip
and loss of maneuverability; hence, timely braking is essential to reduce high-slip scenarios. In
addition to the vehicles own active safety systems, the proposed event-triggered add-on safety
is activated upon being informed about dangers by the road-side infrastructure. The aim is to
incorporate the add-on safety feature to adjust the automatic control parameters for smooth and
timely braking such that a collision is avoided while vehicle’s maneuverability is maintained. We
study two different wireless technologies for communication between the infrastructure and the
vehicles, the Long-Term Evolution (LTE) and the fifth generation (5G) schemes. The framework
is validated through high-fidelity software simulations and the advantages of including the add-
on feature to augment the safety margins for each communication technology is evaluated.
Keywords: Connected vehicles, V2I-I2V communication, Add-on safety, 5G network slicing.
1. INTRODUCTION
The potential to enable fast and reconfigurable mecha-
nisms for increasingly prevalent Automated Driving Sys-
tems (ADS), cooperative vehicles, and advanced driver-
assistance systems (ADAS) underscores the critical need
to develop more reliable safety mechanisms within the
distributed-system framework for intelligent transporta-
tion systems. The functionality of mentioned mechanisms
has gradually shifted from stabilization of vehicle/wheel
dynamics to taking control in emergency cases and guid-
ance control (Bengler et al. (2014); Li et al. (2017); Linsen-
mayer et al. (2017)). Connected vehicles with partially or
conditionally automated driving features (known as Level
3 to Level 4 in vehicles autonomy) not only utilize several
ADS control systems, such as differential braking, torque
vectoring, and active steering, but also can benefit from
shared information over network nodes and infrastructure
to have more proactive and reliable lateral/longitudinal
stability control and to enable dramatic improvements in
fuel efficiency, see Lu et al. (2014); Chang and et al. (2015);
Hung et al. (2019). Differential braking strategies in vehicle
active safety systems are capable of stabilizing the vehicle
not only by expanding the safe operating envelope due to
optimal speed reduction, but through generating correc-
tive yaw moment to enhance yaw tracking performance
based on the request from the path planner or the driver.
Having information about road emergency cases signifi-
cantly improves performance of the braking actuation due
to the fact that local vehicle controllers apply corrective
longitudinal forces less aggressively, leading to less longitu-
dinal slip (Ito et al. (2018)). This results in less lateral tire
force drop, thus, increases maneuverability and capability
of the automated driving system (or the driver) in obstacle
avoidance, sudden path changes, and speed reduction.
New communication technologies such as 5G, provide fast,
flexible and application-oriented network services that can
be adjusted according to user-demands or criticality of the
situation, Molina and Jacob (2018). Features such as net-
work slicing, virtualization, and software-defined network-
ing can be utilized to enhance the coordination of infor-
mation in time-sensitive applications, such as smart trans-
portation. Specifically for safe connected vehicles, commu-
nication with road-side network infrastructure, in the form
of Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) and Infrastructure-to-
Vehicle (I2V), can lead to significant improvement of safety
margins through transmission of critical information about
the road situation (Campolo et al. (2017)). An interesting
feature that can conveniently be utilized is virtual network
slicing. Operating on the same physical hardware, virtual
network slices generally consist of independent sets of soft-
ware functionalities to support the service requirements
for specific applications, see Lucena et al. (2017). These
functionalities include bandwidth, speed, coverage, privacy
and connectivity that can be independently implemented
and optimized to satisfy particular user demands.
We propose a novel event-based add-on safety mechanism
to enhance vehicle controllability at the events of occurring
unexpected danger stimuli on the road. Upon occurrence
of a danger, the vehicle detecting it transmits a warning
signal to road-side infrastructure to be broadcasted to
other vehicles that might not yet have detected the danger.
Depending on how fast the communication is performed,
this may result in a faster notice of the imminent danger
for those vehicles that do not directly face it. Arrival of
the warning signal triggers the add-on safety mechanism
that, together with ADS, control the vehicle such that
the danger is safely avoided with smooth braking. The
communication technology at the road-side infrastructure
determines the quality of information coordination service.
We study two communication schemes, LTE and 5G, as
the supporting network services available at base stations
and evaluate their performance in safety augmentation of
the vehicles. We validate our proposed scheme through
extensive numerical analysis using the high-fidelity CarSim
software, dedicated for vehicle simulations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the model
and problem scenario is described in Sec. 2. The proposed
add-on safety control mechanism and the considered com-
munication schemes are discussed in Sec. 3. Performance
analyses are provided in Sec. 4, and simulation results are
shown in Sec. 5. The paper is concluded in Sec. 6.
2. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM SCENARIO
2.1 Vehicular network model
In a vehicular network with second-order consensus real-
ization, the kinematic description of each vehicle i yields
p˙i(t) = vxi(t), v˙xi(t) = ui(t) + ̺i(t), where pi, vxi are the
differences between the desired vehicle longitudinal posi-
tion/speed trajectories (with a common constant speed
vd) and the measured/absolute ones p¯
i, v¯xi and ̺i(t) is a
zero-mean Gaussian uncertainty uncorrelated across the
connected vehicle. The effect of vehicle yaw rate on the
longitudinal kinematics is ignored. Thus, the measured
longitudinal acceleration axi can be expressed as the time
derivative of longitudinal speed ˙¯vxi. The desired position
for each vehicle is defined by pid = vdt + si, where vd
is the common constant speed and si is a given desired
spacing. The vehicle speed vxi can be measured by GPS
or estimated by using inertial measurement unit (IMU)
and wheel encoders (Selmanaj et al. (2017)). Inspired by
the work in (O¨ncu¨ et al. (2014)) and (Tegling, 2018, Ch.
4), and having access to position and velocity errors, we
define the control input for each vehicle i at time t, with
the set of neighboring vehicles denoted by Ni, as
ui(t)=−
∑
j∈Ni
c¯pij(p
i(t)−pj(t))−
∑
j∈Ni
c¯vij(v
xi(t)−vxj(t)) (1)
− cp0p
i(t)− cv0v
xi(t),
where c¯pij and c¯
v
ij represent constant relative position and
velocity gains in the conventional vehicular formation
framework, and cp0 and c
v
0 denote the constant gains
to adjust the position and velocity of vehicle i w.r.t.
its desired trajectories and are identical for all vehicles.
Combining the kinematics of all vehicles and the control
input, the closed-loop description of the vehicular network
can be written as x˙ = A¯x+ B¯̺, with the augmented state
vector x , [p, v] = [p1, p2, . . . , vx1, vx2, . . .]⊤, and
A¯ =
[
0 I
−cp0I− Lcp −c
v
0I− Lcv
]
, B¯ =
[
0
I
]
, (2)
in which Lcp ,Lcv are position and velocity weighted graph
Laplacian matrices with weights c¯pij and c¯
v
ij , respectively.
Since communication operates in time-slotted fashion,
it is convenient to consider the discrete-time model of
the described vehicular network system, which can be
described as x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + B̺(k) with state and
input matrices A,B obtained by the zero-order hold, i.e.,
A = eA¯(t)Ts and B =
∫ Ts
0
eA¯(t)τ B¯(t)dτ , with Ts denoting
the sampling time. Hence, the dynamics of the vehicle at
time-step k ∈ N∪{0} is the sample of its continuous model
at time kTs, and the next sample time k+1 equals kTs+Ts.
We assume that Ts is small enough, and all vehicles of the
network are sampled with identical sampling times.
2.2 Problem scenario
We model V2I and I2V communication via the road-side
base stations to warn the neighboring vehicles about an ex-
isting danger. The considered situations are specifically the
ones that, first, vehicles do not expect them and, second,
the vehicles that are not directly facing the danger may not
be capable of detecting them in time, e.g., if a pedestrian
suddenly jumps onto the vehicle lane, a sudden congestion
forms ahead, or an unusual obstacle comes into the sight
(see Fig. 1). In these situations, the vehicles behind can
be informed about the imminent danger by the vehicle
facing it, so they perform appropriate actions in time to
avoid harsh braking and possibly collision. The emergency
information can lead to significant enhancement of braking
and vehicle handling performances as it serves the vehicle
(or automated driving) stability programs to generate re-
quired longitudinal forces less aggressively, which leads to
less longitudinal and lateral tire force drop.
In case of confronting such poorly predictable occurrences,
the vehicles that are warned about an immediate danger
via communication with road-side infrastructure can im-
prove their actions accordingly. Note that, the commu-
nicated information about an unexpected danger is an
additional information exchange along with the regular
V2V data exchange between the neighboring vehicles. In
the rest of this paper, we refer to the unexpected danger
situations and the time of their occurrences as danger and
danger time, respectively. To incorporate the described
scenario into our model, we should first notice that such
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Fig. 1. Front vehicle detects an imminent road danger
which following vehicle may not detect in time. A
V2I-I2V communication of a warning signal informs
the following vehicles about an existing danger.
on-road dangers occur sporadically with uncorrelated ran-
dom frequency. Therefore, it is intuitive to assume that
the probability of occurring the next danger is totally
independent and uncorrelated from the previous ones.
Define by tn the time that the n
th danger occurs. We
express the sequence of danger times up to an arbitrary
time-step k by Dk , {t1, . . . , tn}, tn ≤ k, which ensures
that the nth danger has been occurred up until time-step
k. Notice that n and k are statistically uncorrelated.
For simplicity, we consider that dangers occur only in
front of a vehicle and it is detectable only by the vehicle
directly facing it. Each vehicle is assumed to be equipped
with an add-on safety mechanism that is activated when
a warning signal about an imminent danger is received
from the infrastructure. In fact, the vehicle detecting a
danger immediately transmits a warning signal to the
infrastructure to be broadcasted to the vehicles in behind.
Vehicles receiving the warning signal will activate their
add-on safety mechanism and adjust their control actions
accordingly to avoid collision or loss of maneuverability.
We define the binary-valued triggering variable θik, corre-
sponding to the vehicle i at time-step k, as follows
θik =
{
1, if ∃ tn ∈ Dk such that: tn = k,
0, if ∀ tn ∈ Dk : tn < k,
(3)
where θik = 1 activates the add-on safety mechanism at
time-step k and it remains activated until the vehicle is
at complete standstill. Incorporating the event-triggered
variable θik, we introduce the additive gains ∆c
p
i and ∆c
v
i
as add-on safety features to adjust the control input.
The new time-varying control gains then are realized as
c¯pij(k) = c¯
p
ij+θ
i
k∆c
p
i and c¯
v
ij(k) = c¯
v
ij+θ
i
k∆c
v
i , affecting the
closed-loop behavior in x(k + 1) = A(k)x(k) +B(k)̺(k).
The discrete-time control input uik for vehicle i with active
add-on safety mechanism, i.e. if θik=1, can be stated as
uik =−
∑
j∈Ni
(c¯pij + θ
i
k∆c
p
i )(p
i
k − p
j
k) (4)
−
∑
j∈Ni
(c¯vij + θ
i
k∆c
v
i )(v
xi
k − v
xj
k )− c
p
0p
i
k − c
v
0v
xi
k .
The augmented control input vector uk , [u
1
k, u
2
k, . . .] of
the vehicular network at time-step k, can be expressed as
uk = −
[
cp0I+ L¯cp c
v
0I+ L¯cv
]
x, (5)
where, L¯cp and L¯cv are the position and velocity Laplacian
matrices of the vehicular network weighted by the new
gains c¯pij + θ
i
k∆c
p
i and c¯
v
ij + θ
i
k∆c
v
i , respectively.
Remark 1. In line with real technology, we assume that
all vehicles in the network are equipped with Anti-lock
Braking Systems (ABS). The advantage of having ABS is
that the slip ratio does not grow large and tire forces are
kept, at maximum, around the saturation region, before
which tire forces are linear. In fact, as we discuss it in Sec.
4, before the saturation region, it is convenient to consider
a linear model for the slip ratio w.r.t the tire forces.
3. VEHICLE COMMUNICATION MODEL
In case of detecting a danger by a vehicle, a warning signal
is transmitted for the in-range road side base station (BS).
For technical correctness, we consider two assumptions:
(1) for any vehicle there is always a road side BS in range
so that the vehicle can communicate with,
(2) the task of hand over from one BS to the next is
performed perfectly and instantaneously.
Each BS is assumed to service a regular stationary traffic
that is statistically independent from the traffic of warning
signals. Warning signals are transmitted to the BS in
unicast fashion, and they arrive at BS with uplink latency.
In the following, we first introduce the scenario without
V2I-I2V communication, i.e., if a danger occurs, no warn-
ing signal is transmitted through the road-side infrastruc-
ture. We then consider communication with infrastructure
and discuss two wireless technologies; a non-scheduled
queue-based Long Term Evolution (LTE) approach, and
a resource-aware 5G network, for data coordination. We
evaluate the effects of V2I-I2V communication in increas-
ing vehicles’ safety margins compared with the case that
no emergency information is exchanged via infrastructure.
For the purpose of comparisons, the constant gains c¯pij ,
c¯vij , c
p
0 and c
v
0 are assumed identical for all scenarios, and
control inputs are adjusted with ∆cpi and ∆c
v
i .
3.1 Vehicle control without V2I-I2V communication
Assume that in case a danger occurs on the road, no
warning signal is communicated among the vehicles via
the road-side infrastructure. The V2V communication,
however, may exist and the following vehicle (from now
on denoted by i) can receive the brake status of the
front vehicle (from now on denoted by j), using the brake
position sensors. For simplicity, we assume that vehicles
incorporate V2V information solely from the vehicle in
front. Hence, vehicle i is informed about a change in brake
status of vehicle j, i.e., if the brake of vehicle j is activated.
Definition 1 : Driver Reaction Time (RT) is defined as the
temporal duration from the time instant the driver detects
a danger stimulus until an action (braking) is executed.
Characterizing RT is complicated because it is a function
of many parameters such as driver’s age, awareness, tired-
ness, eyesight, psychological state, weather and visibility
condition. Many real and simulator-driven tests have been
carried out to provide some categorically acceptable av-
erage values of RT. A main categorizations corresponds
to the “unexpectedness” nature of the stimuli, i.e., if
driver can anticipate them. It is reported in (Fambro et al.
(1998)) that in real traffic, the mean RT for unanticipated
and anticipated stimuli are 1.3s and 0.7s, respectively.
More recent results (Krauss and Olson (2015)) indicate
that for clearly-visible stimulus, about 85-95% of drivers
have unanticipated RTs of about 1.5s. It also reports that
the minimum observed RT is on average not less than
0.75s. In this paper, the aim is to show that even if a driver
has a short RT, incorporating V2I-I2V communication
can still improve vehicle safety. Moreover, we select the
average RT for unexpected stimuli to be consistent with
the described dangers we consider. Hence, we select a
relatively short average RT of 0.7s for any driver on the
road. The presented results remain valid for longer RTs.
In the absence of V2I-I2V communication, if a danger (that
it cannot be directly detected by vehicle i) occurs in front
of the vehicle j, then the earliest the vehicle i detects it, is
when the driver of vehicle j reacts, i.e., after elapsing the
driver’s RT that vehicle i receives a changed brake status
of vehicle j. Assuming that the ADAS of vehicle i reacts
immediately, it takes, on average, 0.7s to execute braking
from the time that danger is detected by vehicle j.
3.2 Non-scheduled LTE-based V2I-I2V communication
Now we assume that upon detecting a danger by a vehicle,
it transmits a warning signal to a LTE road-side BS to
be communicated with neighboring vehicles. The warning
signal, when received by the ADS system of the following
vehicles, immediately activates the add-on safety mecha-
nism. We model the communication technology at the BS
as a time slotted channel with limited bandwidth, i.e., at
each slot, only a limited number of transmission requests
can be serviced. If there are more arrivals, they are queued
based on the arrival time and transmissions occur when
bandwidth is assigned. Hence, some requests are delivered
to the recipients by a few time slots delay. We, moreover,
assume that the BS is not capable of scheduling, hence,
every data arriving at the BS, either the emergency warn-
ing signals or regular traffic, are queued in a simple first-in
first-out (FIFO) buffer and data is discharged depending
on the queue length and the assigned bandwidth.
We denote the arrival and departure traffics at the BS
at time-step k by ak ∈ Z≥0 and dk ∈ Z≥0, respectively.
Therefore, if the queue has the length ℓk ∈ Z≥0 at time-
step k, the process ℓk+1 has the following evolution
ℓk+1 = ak +max[ℓk − dk, 0], ℓ0 = 0. (6)
Definition 2 : A discrete time process P (t) is said to be
rate stable, if
P
[
lim
t→∞
P (t)
t
= 0
]
= 1.
According to the Definition 2, the process (6) is rate stable
if and only if (Neely, 2010, Th. 2.4):
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
[aτ − dτ ] ≤ 0.
To avoid infinite delays, we assume that queues at BSs
are rate stable. Note that, rate stability is not a per-
time-step condition, but a time-averaged. Although the
average departure rate is greater than the average arrival
rate, there might be time instances that the realized
departure bandwidth cannot service all the arrived packets
plus the ones already queued. Hence, data delivery would
experience some delays at some finite number of instances.
Using Kendall’s notation, we consider M/M/1 queues at
the BSs, i.e., the arrival traffic at the BS follows the Pois-
son distribution and the service times of the received data
packets are distributed exponentially. Compared to the
previous set up, i.e. without V2I-I2V communication, here
the following vehicle is informed about the existing danger
subject to the uplink and downlink latency plus queuing
service delay. Therefore, if after occurring a danger, the
uplink/downlink latency plus service delay is shorter than
the RT, the vehicle in behind receives the warning signal
in shorter time by the infrastructure and can react faster
to the danger. We denote the uplink delay, i.e., the time
between sending the warning signal and receiving it at the
BS, by τul. Similarly, we define τdl as the downlink delay,
the gap between the time the warning signal is broadcasted
by the BS until it is received by the vehicles. Queuing delay
is also denoted by τq, with the mean 0 ≤ E[τq] < 1 for pre-
empty queues, see (Mamduhi et al. (2018)). Therefore,
if a danger is detected by vehicle j at time-step k, the
time that the transmitted warning signal is received by
the vehicle i in behind is k + τul + τq + τdl. For technical
convenience regarding the discrete model of vehicles, the
warning signal transmitted by the vehicle j at time-step k
will be received by the vehicle i at time k + r, r ∈ Z≥0,
where rTs ≤ τul + τq + τdl < (r + 1)Ts.
3.3 5G-supported slicing-enabled V2I-I2V communication
Here we assume that 5G-supported BSs are in range for
data exchange among the vehicles. In addition, we presume
that multiples of the BSs are remotely supported by a
cloud data center that can provide network services such
as resource management, virtualization and slicing for the
local BSs. In accordance with capabilities of 5G networks,
we consider a simple service slicing mechanism available
for the BSs facilitating a situation-aware serviceability. 1
Employing the network slicing scheme (Fig. 2 depicts a
schematic of the two discussed supporting network tech-
nologies at BS), the flagged warning signals are serviced
through a specific network slice including a dedicated
data transmission link. Since the described dangers oc-
cur sporadically on the road, the network slice dedicated
to warning signals does not need to have a large band-
width, however, the transmission link needs to be su-
per fast. This entails that the communication resources
(bandwidth and latency) are divided into one high-speed
and low-bandwidth slice to support fast transmission of
the emergency warning signals, and a regular-speed high-
bandwidth slice for the transmission of regular traffic.
With the network slicing mechanism, transmission of
warning signals does not suffer from queuing delay, i.e.,
1 Discussing the core technology of network slicing and virtualiza-
tion and their standards in 5G networks is out of scope of this paper.
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Fig. 2. (a) LTE non-scheduled and (b) 5G slicing-enabled
BS serviceability. Red flags and envelopes depict the
warning signals and regular traffic, respectively.
τq = 0, though 5G networks induce a tiny amount of delay
even at their fastest mode. The delay is targeted to be 1ms,
however, reports from the operational 5G infrastructures
suggest that this target has not yet been consistently
achieved at the application level. For the existing physical
and virtual 5G infrastructure, the latency of 5 − 15ms is
suggested for the fastest data transmission. Denote the 5G-
supported latency of the fastest slice by τf . Since uplink
and downlink latency still exist, denoting k as the time
instance a danger is detected by vehicle j, the warning
signal will be received by the vehicle i at k+ τul+ τf + τdl.
4. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Now we investigate the advantages of the proposed
infrastructure-supported add-on safety mechanism on ve-
hicle longitudinal response in the tire levels at the event of
occurring road dangers. We analyze the performance of the
add-on safety features for each of the described communi-
cation scenarios on two critical parameters, longitudinal
slip ratio and stopping distance, that essentially represent
aspects of safety. The stopping distance is defined as the
total traveled distance between the time that braking sys-
tem is activated until the vehicle is at complete standstill.
Let a danger be detected by the vehicle j at a time-step k.
The following vehicle i, is informed about the existing
danger at time-step k + r, and r varies depending on
the selected communication scenario. For the case that no
V2I communication exists (Sec. 3.1), we have r = ⌈RT
Ts
⌉.
When vehicles communicate warning signals via LTE BS
without scheduling (Sec. 3.2), r is a function of τq that
varies depending on the real-time queue length, arriving
traffic at the BS, and the service bandwidth. Assuming
constant τul and τdl, we have r = ⌈
τul+τq+τdl
Ts
⌉. For the
5G-supported BS enabled with network slicing (Sec. 3.3),
vehicle i receives the warning signal about the danger
detected by the vehicle j at time-step k, with total latency
of r = ⌈
τul+τf+τdl
Ts
⌉. Denoting the time that vehicle i comes
at complete standstill by k¯, the stopping distance is the
distance traveled by vehicle i during the interval [k+ r, k¯].
Longitudinal slip ratio for vehicle i, denoted by κik, de-
termines the tire slip in contact with road surface in
longitudinal direction. As vehicles are equipped with ABS,
which modulate the brake forces around the saturation
region, we employ a linear model of slip ratio, as κik =
fik
Ci
,
where f ik denotes the longitudinal tire forces of vehicle i at
time-step k and Ci is longitudinal tire stiffness. Assuming
uniform normal load distribution and neglecting the load
transfer and lateral effects of the control signal uik, we have
from the Newton’s second law that uik =
fik
Mi
, with Mi the
effective mass of the vehicle i. Therefore, we obtain the
slip-acceleration relation, for vehicle i at time-step k, as
uik =
Ci
Mi
κik. (7)
It is desired that the vehicle i is at complete stop within
a safe distance from vehicle j with smooth deceleration
to avoid high slip and loss of maneuverability. It should
be noted that, equality (7) is valid for low slip ratio. As
ADS and vehicles are ABS-equipped, tire forces are kept
around the saturation region to avoid high slip ratio, thus
with this assumption, linear expression (7) remains valid.
Control input uik represents the deceleration applied to
vehicle through braking, and we are interested in finding
the maximum deceleration during the stopping time (the
infinity norm of the sequence of control inputs during
the braking process.). From the moment that the ABS
is activated, it takes a short time, so called pressure build-
up time (denoted by τp), till the maximum deceleration
is reached. For the advanced braking technologies, τp is
significantly short. For the ease of analyses, we assume
that the maximum deceleration, when reached, remains
constant til the vehicle comes to the complete standstill.
Assume that vehicle i has the speed vik+r (we drop x in the
superscript for the ease of notation) when it is informed
about a danger detected by vehicle j. In the presence of
the event-based add-on safety, θik+r=1 and add-on safety
features are activated at time k + r until k¯. Total braking
time of vehicle i is k¯−k−r. As deceleration is constant after
τp, and θ
i
t=1, ∀t∈ [k + r, k¯], the maximum deceleration of
vehicle i during the braking process can be obtained as
|uimax| = |u
i
t|∞ = max
t∈[k+r,k¯]
|uit| (8)
= | − (c¯pij +∆c
p
i )(p
i
k¯−τǫ
− pj
k¯−τǫ
)−
(c¯vij +∆c
v
i )(v
i
k¯−τǫ
− vj
k¯−τǫ
)− cp0 p
i
k¯−τǫ
− cv0 v
i
k¯−τǫ
|
where, k¯− τǫ is an infinitesimal moment before the time k¯
(τǫ≈0), when the maximum deceleration begins to reduce.
The resulting maximum slip ratio during the time interval
[k + r + τp, k¯ − τǫ], can be obtained from (7) and (8), as
κimax =
Mi
Ci
|uimax|. (9)
and, κimax is the maximum slip determined by the ABS.
4.1 Tuning safety parameters: desired maximum slip ratio
The add-on safety parameters ∆cpi ,∆c
v
i are generally
designed based on the safe distance with front vehicle and
in order to maintain smooth deceleration that leads to
low slip ratio and high maneuverability of the following
vehicle. To have a meaningful comparison, first we discuss
safety in form of final relative distance of the vehicles when
they are at complete standstill, while ∆cpi and ∆c
v
i are
adjusted such that slip ratio dose not exceed a desired
value, denoted by κ¯imax. Hence, considering τǫ ≈ 0 for the
ease of derivations, the following inequality is desired:
Mi
Ci
|uimax| ≤ κ¯
i
max. (10)
It is intuitive to assume that the vehicle j, that has
detected the danger before vehicle i, had already come
to standstill at k¯, i.e., vj
k¯
= 0. Moreover, let the velocity
of the vehicle i at the time of being informed about the
danger, i.e. k + r, be denoted by vik+r and assume that
it remains constant till maximum deceleration is reached,
i.e. vik+r = v
i
k+r+τp
. Since the maximum deceleration is
constant during [k+r+τp, k¯], we can employ the quadratic
equation of motion to compute the distance traveled by
vehicle i during the mentioned time interval, as follows:
pi
k¯
= pik+r+τp + v
i
k+r+τp(k¯ − k − r − τp) (11)
+
1
2
uimax(k¯ − k − r − τp)
2.
From (8), (10) and (11), and knowing that vj
k¯
= 0, we
can compute the relative distance between two vehicles at
stopping time for vehicle i, i.e., k¯, as follows:
pi
k¯
− pj
k¯
≤
Ciκ¯
i
max
Mi(c¯
p
ij +∆c
p
i )
(
1 +
(k¯ − k − r − τp)2
2
)
(12)
−
cp0
(
pik+r+τp + v
i
k+r+τp
(k¯ − k − r − τp)
)
c¯pij +∆c
p
i
.
It can be seen from (12) that, under the maximum slip
ratio constraint κ¯imax, the upper-bound on the distance
between two vehicles at their standstill positions depends
on two parameters r and ∆cpi . The first parameter is
determined by the choice of the communication scenario,
as discussed at the beginning of the Section 4, and ∆cpi
is the event-triggered adjustment on the control input to
augment the safety margin (relative distance). If no road-
side communication exists, then we have r = ⌈RT
Ts
⌉, and
since no add-on safety is considered, ∆cpi = 0 which leads
to a lower value for the right side of the inequality (12).
This means, in the absence of V2I and I2V communication,
the vehicles are more prone to collide. This justifies the use
of road-side infrastructure to broadcast danger informa-
tion to the following vehicles. Lower r, that means faster
communication between vehicles, increases the final rela-
tive distance. Hence, 5G with network slicing is superior
to non-scheduled LTE as, first, high data rate data traffic
will not affect delivery time of emergency signals in 5G,
and second, queuing delay does not exist.
Increasing ∆cpi , that essentially leads to higher deceler-
ation, also increases the final relative distance. However,
we should note that, we are not allowed to increase ∆cpi
freely, as increasing it increases the slip ratio as well. At
some point, increasing ∆cpi will not increase deceleration
due to ABS that keeps tire forces at maximum around the
saturation region. It is concluded that, road-side commu-
nication clearly enhances safety compared to the case that
only V2V communication exists, while between the two
described communication schemes with infrastructure, 5G
generally outperforms LTE as latency is at minimum.
Note that, the expression (12) does not guarantee that
the vehicles never collide (i.e. pi
k¯
− pj
k¯
≤ 0) for all values of
pik+r+τp and v
i
k+r+τp
and for any constants Ci,Mi, c¯
p
ij and
κimax. We will see this in the next section that even in the
presence of add-on safety mechanism, if the initial speed
of the vehicle is high and their initial distance is relatively
short, then avoiding collision may not happen. However,
shorter r and appropriate tuning of ∆cpi can increase the
reaction time and the maximum deceleration to make the
vehicle stop in time. It is also worth mentioning that
shorter r results in farther back pik+r+τp which increases
the relative distance pi
k¯
− pj
k¯
, according to (12).
Remark 2. We can repeat the above discussions for rela-
tive velocity between the two vehicles. For the purpose of
brevity, we do not discuss it in detail, however, the results
would be similar to that of expression (12), with the major
exception that ∆cvi also appears as a tuning parameter.
4.2 Desired minimum relative distance
Now, we consider that a given minimum relative distance
between the vehicles i and j, denoted by pi
k¯
− pj
k¯
≤ pijf , at
complete standstill is desired. Note that for a safe setup,
pijf need to be negative. Having this, together with the
expressions (8) and (11), we obtain
ui
k¯
≥ −
|pijf |
(
c¯pij +∆c
p
i
)
1 +
(k¯−k−r−τp)2
2
(13)
+
cp0
(
pik+r+τp + v
i
k+r+τp
(k¯ − k − r − τp)
)
1 +
(k¯−k−r−τp)2
2
,
where, |ui
k¯
| ≤ |uimax| should be regarded not to exceed
the maximum slip ratio. According to (13), for a desired
pijf , the maximum deceleration is a function of the tuning
parameters r and ∆cpi . Similar to the Section 4.1, faster
access to danger information by the following vehicle, i.e.
shorter r, decreases the maximum required deceleration
ui
k¯
to stop the two vehicles with the distance of pijf . In
the absence of the add-on safety mechanism, ∆cpi = 0
which results in higher deceleration. Having the event-
triggered safety mechanism, we can decrease the maximum
required deceleration by increasing the gain ∆cpi to stop
the vehicles at the distance of pijf . It can be deduced from
(13) that, the greater the desired relative distance pijf and
the higher the velocity of the vehicle i, i.e. vik+r+τp , are at
the time that the danger information is received, the higher
the deceleration is required. Nevertheless, to guarantee
maneuverability, the maximum deceleration cannot be set
too high as it leads to large slip ratio. Therefore, not any
given pijf is feasible. As we will show this behavior clearly
in the next section, the required maximum deceleration
may not be realized by the ADS system as the ABS does
not allow the slip ratio to go beyond the safe region.
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Sudden changes in the path planning or vehicle forma-
tion control strategies in vehicle’s (and automated driving
system’s) dynamic stabilization programs leads to harsh
brake (or throttle) actuation. As discussed in Sec. 2, high
slip ratio originated by such harsh brake or acceleration
requests results in considerable drop in lateral tire forces,
thus makes vehicle more prone to instability. This section
studies the advantages of utilizing an event-triggered add-
on safety mechanism in the networked vehicular system,
to reduce high-slip scenarios by proper and timely brak-
ing for two different driving cases. Validation has been
done through software simulations in CarSim, which is a
system-level high-fidelity vehicle dynamics simulator. The
relative position and speed signals are available through
radar and vision systems in the current human-in-the-loop
or automated driving systems. The ABS, which maintains
tire forces around the saturation point (at the end of the
linear region), is an inherent part of ADS and ADAS for
networked vehicle systems and is used in simulations. This
also supports the linear tire force assumption in Sec. 4.
The scenarios without V2I-I2V, non-scheduled LTE-based,
and 5G-supported slicing-enabled communications, are de-
noted by NC, V2I, and SV2I, respectively. In simulations,
vehicles are identical with mass M = 1580 kg, effective
tire radius Re = 0.30 m, and wheel base Wb = 2.34 m;
constant and additive relative position and velocity gains
are c¯pij = 0.1, c¯
v
ij = 0.23 and ∆c
p
i = 0.04,∆c
v
i = 0.11 for all
vehicles; adjusting gains are c¯p0=0.08, c¯
v
0=0.05; the desired
relative distance at standstill between two vehicles’ centers
of gravity is 10 m; and the longitudinal acceleration noise is
zero-mean with the variance of 0.2m/s2. The longitudinal
slip ratio κl =
Reωl−v
a
x
max{Reωl,vax}
at a (font/rear) axles l of
vehicle i, with Re as the effective radius of the tyre, ωl
as the average wheel speed at the axles l of vehicle i, and
vax as the longitudinal speed of vehicle i, is an indicator
of healthy brake scenarios due to its correlation with the
longitudinal tire forces; it is monitored in simulations.
In the first case (Case 1), a longitudinal deceleration
scenario, due to a danger incidence in front of the lead
vehicle j, is simulated and the responses (slip ratio and
longitudinal speed/acceleration) of the vehicle i in behind
are demonstrated. In Case 1, the initial speed of vehicles j
and i are 80 and 95 kph, respectively. The front vehicle’s
ADAS activates its brakes at t = 0, due to a danger; the
reaction time for the vehicle in behind is assumed to be 0.7
s. Then, the effect of communication is compared for non-
scheduled (V2I) and 5G-supported slicing-enabled (SV2I)
scenarios with τul + τdl = 0.015 s. The queuing delay τq
is realized from an exponential distribution with mean
0.05 s and variance 0.015 ms. The 5G network induces
latency τf selected from a uniform distribution over the
interval [0.005, 0.015] s, for the network slice that services
the warning signals. The measured longitudinal speed and
acceleration for vehicles i and j are shown in Fig. 3.
As can be seen from Fig. 3, front vehicle j have mild
deceleration, but the measured acceleration for vehicle i
(in behind) quickly reaches to the capacity of the dry road
(almost 10 m/s2) to maintain desired spacing and stop
effectively for NC scenario. This results in high slips and
activation of the ABS (and consequent slip ratio oscilla-
tions) for NC scenario to modulate brake actuation around
the longitudinal tire forces’ saturation region (around slip
ratio 22% on dry road); this is demonstrated in Fig. 4,
in which longitudinal slip ratios for the front and rear
axles of vehicle i is compared for NC, V2I, and SV2I
communication scenarios in Case 1. Simulation results
Fig. 3. Speed and acceleration profiles (measured) for
vehicles i and j (blue) for NC, V2I, and SV2I scenarios
confirm that SV2I leads to the lowest slip ratio for this
driving scenario, thus facilitates better maneuverability in
case of sudden cornering/lane-change request by the driver
or ADS. The minor difference between the slip ratios on
front and rear tires are due to load transfer during brake,
which is harsher for NC, that reduces longitudinal force
capacity on rear tires, thus increases rear slip ratios.
Fig. 4. Front and rear tires’ slip ratios in Case 1
In order to evaluate the performance of the add-on safety
in harsher scenarios, in terms of maintaining the safe
distance between vehicles, Case 2 is numerically simulated.
In this driving case, the test setup and vehicles are
similar to Case 1, but the initial speeds of vehicles j
and i are 85 and 110 kph, respectively. To show the
effectiveness of three scenarios in such harsh maneuver,
the requested deceleration by the closed-loop system (2)
and the measured one are shown in Fig. 5 for vehicle i.
In Case 2 simulations, NC shows the largest deceleration
request, which is not achievable due to the road-tire
force capacity, thus, leads to brake modulation by the
ABS around the saturation point to use the maximum
attainable deceleration. However, the control system can
not maintain the safe distance between two vehicles as can
be seen from Fig. 5 (top), in which longitudinal position
trajectories for both vehicles intersects at about 3.5 s
and we observe collision. Longitudinal slip for Case 2
simulations are shown in Fig. 6, in which NC leads to large
slips during long ABS activation.
Fig. 5. Control inputs and measured accelerations for NC,
V2I, and SV2I scenarios
Fig. 6. Front/rear tyres’ slip ratio for vehicle i in Case 2
In contrast, SV2I not only maintains longitudinal slip
around 7%, which is convenient in terms of proactive and
mild brake involvement, but also keeps the safe distance
between two vehicles; the test with V2I also shows lower
slip ratio, when compared with NC. These results confirm
effectiveness of utilizing a V2I-based event-triggered add-
on safety mechanism for reducing longitudinal slip and
maintaining safe distance between the vehicles.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an event-triggered safety mecha-
nism that aims, together with the ADS system, to enhance
the controllability of connected vehicles upon occurrence
of on-road unexpected dangers. Using road-side infrastruc-
ture, danger information can be exchanged faster among
the vehicles, activating the add-on safety features sooner.
The control input is adjusted to avoid the danger safely, i.e.
to avoid collision and brake smoothly not to lose maneu-
verability. We study two wireless technologies to support
communication between the vehicles and the base stations,
the LTE and the 5G schemes, and compare the resulting
performance in terms of how fast danger information can
be transmitted. We then evaluate the advantages of an
add-on safety mechanism in augmenting the vehicle safety
for each communication scenario. Our results are validated
through high-fidelity CarSim software simulations.
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